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Abstract 
Personal connections between creators and evaluators of scientific works are ubiquitous, and the possibility 
of bias ever-present. Although connections have been shown to bias prospective judgments of (uncertain) 
future performance, it is unknown whether such biases occur in the much more concrete task of assessing 
the scientific validity of already completed work, and if so, why. This study presents evidence that personal 
connections between authors and reviewers of neuroscience manuscripts are associated with biased 
judgments and explores the mechanisms driving the effect. Using reviews from 7,981 neuroscience 
manuscripts submitted to the journal PLOS ONE, which instructs reviewers to evaluate manuscripts only 
on scientific validity, we find that reviewers favored authors close in the co-authorship network by ~0.11 
points on a 1.0 – 4.0 scale for each step of proximity. PLOS ONE’s validity-focused review and the 
substantial amount of favoritism shown by distant vs. very distant reviewers, both of whom should have 
little to gain from nepotism, point to the central role of substantive disagreements between scientists in 
different “schools of thought.” The results suggest that removing bias from peer review cannot be 
accomplished simply by recusing the closely-connected reviewers, and highlight the value of recruiting 
reviewers embedded in diverse professional networks.   
1. Introduction 
Around the globe, public and private organizations invest more than $2 trillion into research and 
development (Industrial Research Institute, 2017). Many of these organizations, including funding agencies 
and publishers of scientific research, face the challenging task of allocating limited financial or reputational 
resources across scientific projects, which require increasingly deep and varied domain expertise to evaluate 
(Jones, 2009; Wuchty, Jones, & Uzzi, 2007). Despite its ubiquity, however, peer review faces persistent 
critiques of low reliability and bias. Reviewers of a particular scientific work disagree with each other’s 
assessment notoriously often (Bornmann, 2011; Campanario, 1998; Cicchetti, 1991; Marsh, Jayasinghe, & 
Bond, 2008). Indeed, agreement is often only marginally better than chance and comparable to agreement 
achieved for Rorschach inkblot tests (Lee, 2012). A bigger concern than the variance of reviews, however, 
is reviewers’ bias for or against particular social and intellectual groups, and particularly those to whom 
they are personally connected. Given that scientists often work on highly specialized topics in small, dense 
clusters, the most relevant expert evaluators are typically peers of the research creators and many 
organizations turn to them for input. Nevertheless, many researchers have suspected that personal 
connections between reviewers and creators are the locus of nepotism and other systematic biases.  
 Several studies of scientific evaluation have demonstrated that personal connections are, indeed, 
associated with biased reviews. For example, recent studies document that reviewers of grant proposals and 
candidates for promotion favor the research of collaborators and coworkers (Bagues, Sylos-Labini, & 
Zinovyeva, 2016; Jang, Doh, Kang, & Han, 2016; Sandström & Hällsten, 2007; van den Besselaar, 2012). 
Other research documents that higher ratings tend to be given to the research of men (Bagues, Sylos-Labini, 
& Zinovyeva, 2017; Wennerås & Wold, 1997). These patterns of widespread disagreement and bias in 
scientific evaluation greatly complicate selection of the most deserving research, which generates a new 
problem, that of “reviewing the reviewers” to identify which of the cacophonous voices provides unbiased 
information or de-biasing the reviews. Meanwhile, from the perspective of scientists and scholars, 
evaluation decisions that drive their careers and billions of research dollars are possibly unfair and, to a 
large extent, the “luck of the reviewer draw” (Cole, Cole, & Simon, 1981, p. 885).  
Despite the centrality of peer review to the scientific enterprise and increasing research attention 
devoted to it, important questions remain. First, existing studies of reviewer bias have focused on 
prospective judgments, like promotions and funding competitions. Administrators’ and reviewers’ task in 
these settings is to predict future performance. In this context, prospective judgments are inherently 
uncertain and may hinge on information asymmetry, such that particular reviewers have private information 
about the applicant that other reviewers do not possess. In contrast, it is unknown whether personal 
connections influence retrospective judgments as in manuscript review, where the task is to assess 
completed work. Consequently, uncertainty regarding the evaluated work should be lower and, in principle, 
all reviewers should have equal access to the relevant information, presented within the manuscript. In this 
way, it is plausible that personal connections are minimally associated with bias in retrospective 
evaluations.  
Second, current studies do not distinguish among mechanism(s) driving bias. Reviewers may favor the 
work from closely connected authors for many reasons, including nepotism, similar tastes for “soft” 
evaluation criteria like “significance” or “novelty,” and even shared views on contested substantive matters 
– a view we call “schools of thought” to suggest deeper shared theoretical, methodological and 
epistemological assumptions and commitments. Disambiguating these mechanisms is critical because the 
effectiveness of policies designed to mitigate reviewer bias hinge on the mechanisms driving it. In the case 
of nepotism, the most effective policy may be to recuse reviewers closely connected with those reviewed 
or provide reviewer training on conscious and non-conscious biases in judgment. In the case of soft 
evaluation criteria, it may be important to separate the review process into technical “objective” and softer 
“subjective” components. With respect to schools of thought, it may be important to select reviewers 
belonging to diverse schools. In practice, these mechanisms are difficult to disentangle: personal networks 
overlap with individuals’ scientific views, and evaluations typically collapse technical and soft criteria 
(Lamont, 2009; Lee, 2012; Travis & Collins, 1991).  
This study addresses both aforementioned shortcomings of the literature on scientific evaluation. 
Empirically, the study moves beyond prospective judgments and estimates the effect that personal 
connections play in the concrete, retrospective context of manuscript review. We use the editorial files of 
7,981 neuroscience manuscripts submitted in 2011-2 to the journal PLOS ONE, which instructs reviewers 
to evaluate manuscripts’ scientific validity only. We also measure connections between reviewers and 
authors by their relative location in the co-authorship network. Co-authorship distances are strongly related 
to whom authors nominate as reviewers, suggesting that formal co-authorship captures affinities between 
scientists. We find that reviewers give authors a ~0.11 point bonus (1.0=Reject, 4.0=Accept) for each step 
of proximity in the co-authorship network. Our study does not measure quality directly, so we cannot 
distinguish whether close reviewers overestimate the scientific validity of manuscripts or distant reviewers 
underestimate it. Nevertheless, if a single, true assessment of a manuscript’s validity exists, our study 
reveals bias: reviewers’ judgments systematically over- or under-shoot this value as a function of co-
authorship closeness.  
Conceptually, our study attempts to disentangle possible mechanisms driving co-author bias more 
thoroughly than prior work. To do this, we exploit the uniqueness of PLOS ONE’s review process and 
patterns in reviewer decisions. Unlike conventional journals that evaluate work on both technical and “soft” 
criteria, such as “significance” or “novelty,” PLOS ONE evaluates manuscripts only on whether they are 
scientifically valid1. Reviewers disagree frequently even on this technical evaluation (inter-rater reliability 
= 0.19), which suggests that disagreement and biases cannot be attributed to reviewer differences on soft 
evaluation criteria alone. Furthermore, we find that the co-authorship bonus is not limited to the closest co-
author connections only. Distant reviewers (co-authors of co-authors) give more favorable scores than very 
distant reviewers (co-authors of co-authors of co-authors and beyond), despite both types of reviewers 
having little to gain from nepotism. This pattern suggests that biases are unlikely to be driven by nepotism 
alone. Instead, we draw on literature from science and technology studies and sociology of science to argue 
that scientists’ views on contested substantive matters overlap with their personal connections. 
Consequently, closely connected researchers are likely to belong to the same “school of thought” and favor 
each other’s work because it matches their scientific views.  
In sum, we find evidence of co-author bias in an unlikely context – judgments of scientific validity 
regarding completed work. The data are most consistent with scientists in the same substantive “school of 
thought” favoring work from other members of that school. Schools of thought problematize policies used 
by journals and funding agencies around the world to mitigate bias. Rather than simply recusing evaluators 
most closely connected from participating on the assumption of nepotism, our findings suggest that fair 
evaluations require evaluators from diverse scientific clusters.  
2. Disagreement and biases in peer review  
A voluminous literature has documented ways in which scientific evaluations do not necessarily 
converge on the underlying quality of the work or individual. Given the literature’s long-standing focus on 
disagreement, we first establish levels of disagreement typical of conventional evaluation settings, in which 
validity, significance and novelty are simultaneously valued, in order to compare those levels to PLOS 
ONE, which evaluates validity alone. Next, the section reviews studies of biases in peer review associated 
                                                     
1 PLOS ONE also requires that manuscripts be clearly written and adhere to the journal’s data policy. A blank 
reviewer form is available at the following address: http://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/file?id=t6Vo/plosone-
reviewer-form.pdf. Accessed 2017-12-20. 
with personal connections. We identify three mechanisms hypothesized to drive bias - nepotism, subjective 
review criteria, and schools of thought – and outline some conditions that mediate their salience. We return 
to these mechanisms in Section 4.5, which utilizes PLOS ONE’s uniqueness to disentangle those 
mechanisms more unambiguously than previously possible.  
2.1. Empirical patterns: low reliability and favoritism 
Reviewers frequently disagree about which work or person merits publication or funding (Bornmann, 
2011; Campanario, 1998; Cicchetti, 1991; Wessely, 1998). Although some debate remains regarding 
whether peer review in multi-paradigm, low-consensus disciplines like sociology is less reliable than in 
high-consensus disciplines like physics (Hargens, 1988), disagreement is pervasive across disciplines 
(Bornmann, Mutz, & Daniel, 2010; Cole et al., 1981; Marsh et al., 2008; Rothwell & Martyn, 2000). In 
reviewing this literature, Cicchetti found that inter-rater reliabilities (0 = no agreement, 1.0 = perfect 
agreement) ranged between 0.19-0.54 for social science journals and 0.26-0.37 for medical journals 
(Cicchetti, 1991: Table 2). In a review of grant proposals submitted to the U.S. National Science 
Foundation, agreement was no better: inter-rater reliability ranged from 0.18 for chemical dynamics grants 
to 0.37 for economics grants (Cicchetti, 1991: Table 4). These low levels of agreement are consistent with 
the meta-analysis of Bornmann and colleagues, who evaluated 48 manuscript review reliability studies to 
find that mean inter-rater reliability had an intra-class correlation of 0.34 and a Cohen’s kappa of 0.17, with 
the strongest studies showing lower levels of agreement (Bornmann et al., 2010). In sum, inter-rater 
reliabilities are low across disciplines and review settings, typically falling in the range of 0.10 – 0.40.   
In addition to low reliability, a number of studies have found that reviewers favor the research of closely 
connected scientists. These studies typically measure personal connections by shared institutional 
affiliation. For example, Wennerås and Wold used data from a Swedish postdoctoral fellowship competition 
in medicine and found that reviewers gave applicants sharing an institutional affiliation a “friendship 
bonus” of 0.22 points on 0.0-4.0 scale (Wennerås & Wold, 1997). Sandstrom and Hallsten replicated this 
study with a newer wave of applicants to the same Swedish competition and found that applicants sharing 
affiliation with reviewers received a 15% bonus on scores (Sandström & Hällsten, 2007). Studies of other 
funding competitions have corroborated these findings. Jang and colleagues found that reviewers of grants 
submitted to the National Research Foundation of Korea gave slightly more favorable scores to applicants 
with whom they presently or previously shared an institutional affiliation (Jang et al., 2016). Bagues and 
colleagues (2016) found a similar pattern in promotion decisions for Italian academics: reviewers favored 
candidates from the same institution or with whom they had previously co-authored. Li (2017) explored the 
effect of a different type of relatedness on review outcomes at US National Institutes of Health funding 
competitions. Measuring relatedness between grant applicants and the review panel by how many members 
of the panel cited the applicant’s work, she found that for each additional (“permanent”) review member 
citing the applicant’s work, chances of winning the grant increased by 2.2% (Li, 2017).  
These studies consistently found that reviewers favored scientific work or candidates within their 
professional networks. In each case, however, the judgments examined were prospective, predicting future 
performance or impact. Prospective judgments are informationally distinct from retrospective ones. 
Prospective judgments entail uncertainty, and personal connections may give reviewers differential access 
to information that helps resolve uncertainty, that is whether the candidate or application will achieve its 
aspirations. To be sure, reviewers who personally know a candidate or a work’s author(s) may draw on this 
private information in a biased way, as Bagues et al.’s (2016) and Li’s (2017) results suggest. Nevertheless, 
these and other studies (Travis & Collins, 1991) indicate that information asymmetries are key to 
understanding the role personal connections play in prospective contexts.  
An equally crucial but under-researched context is that of retrospective judgments, such as manuscript 
review, in which reviewers evaluate finished work. In manuscript review, information asymmetry across 
reviewers should be much diminished or nonexistent for two reasons. First, manuscripts should in principle 
report all information necessary to evaluate them. Second, in grant competitions, a small panel may be 
tasked with reviewing all applications from a large field, creating large disparities in how knowledgeable 
reviewers are about a particular application (Li, 2017). In contrast, reviewers of manuscripts tend to be 
selected specifically for special expertise in a manuscript’s topic, resulting in relatively lower variance in 
reviewer expertise. Consequently, mechanisms other than information asymmetry are likely to be key in 
how personal connections affect retrospective judgments.  
 To our knowledge, only one empirical study examined personal connections in a retrospective context. 
Laband and Piette (1994) hypothesized that editors of economics journals use personal connections to 
authors in the field to “recruit” high-quality articles, by outcompeting editors without such connections. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, the authors found that articles published by editors who share an employing 
or PhD-granting institution with the articles’ authors receive an average of about four more citations than 
articles published by unconnected editors. Beyond this example of editor behavior, it is unclear whether 
personal connections affect manuscript reviewers’ decisions, and if so, how. 
2.2. Mechanisms driving bias 
Scholars debate the causes and epistemological legitimacy of bias in peer review (Lamont, 2009, 
Chapter 2; Lee, 2012). The literature has focused on three mechanisms: nepotism, subjective review criteria, 
and schools of thought. These are not exhaustive: reviewers may be influenced by factors that are 
epistemological, cognitive (Boudreau, Guinan, Lakhani, & Riedl, 2016), social psychological (Olbrecht & 
Bornmann, 2010; Pier et al., 2017; Roumbanis, 2016), and even ephemeral and idiosyncratic, like mood 
(Englich & Soder, 2009; Roumbanis, 2016). Nevertheless, each mechanism seeks to account for a major 
source of evaluation variation.  
Nepotism  
Research on bias in peer review typically follows Robert Merton and colleagues in positing that scientific 
content can and should be separated from the characteristics of its creators (Robert King Merton, 1973; H. 
Zuckerman & Merton, 1971)2. When peer reviewers evaluate only qualities of the work’s content, so-called 
                                                     
2 This literature tends to downplay correlations between particularistic considerations and universalistic ones, yet 
these correlations are substantial (Lamont, 2009, p. 157). For instance, in their analysis of millions of biomedical 
publications, Feng Shi and colleagues find that the best predictor of collaboration (typically considered by the peer 
review literature as a purely “social” relationship) are similar methodological preferences (typically considered an 
“epistemic” preference) (Shi, Foster, & Evans, 2015).  
“universalistic” considerations, peer review is deemed epistemologically legitimate and unbiased. By 
contrast, when reviewers consider “particularistic” characteristics of the work’s creators, peer review is 
deemed epistemologically tainted and biased (Lamont & Mallard, 2005; Lee, Sugimoto, Zhang, & Cronin, 
2013). Such considerations include anything “particular” to a works’ creators and irrelevant to its content, 
including their gender, race, or religious identity, political ideology, any other markers of social or cultural 
category membership (Bagues et al., 2017), and connections between creator and reviewer.  
One type of particularistic bias – nepotism – is of special concern. Scientists often work in dense 
clusters, and a work’s most relevant reviewers are often individuals within that cluster. Collaborative 
connections between authors and reviewers raise the prospect that reviewers review nepotistically, favoring 
closely connected individuals on non-scientific grounds. Nepotism may be exacerbated by competition. 
Although empirical evidence within the scientific domain is anecdotal (e.g. Stumpf, 1980), studies of other 
domains suggest that nepotism is especially likely in competitive environments (Bazerman & Moore, 2008, 
pp. 156–159; Berg, 2016). The role of competition follows from a rational choice perspective: favoring 
personal connections on non-scientific grounds is norm-violating (Robert King Merton, 1973) and carries 
the risk of reputational damage and even self-deprecation. Consequently, reviewers will only take such 
costly action when there is something valuable at stake, such as a major competitive award. Consistent with 
this intuition, a survey of applicants for highly competitive grants from the U.S. National Cancer Institute 
found that nearly 40% viewed its peer review system as an “old boys’ network,” while more than 30% felt 
that reviewers engaged in serious norm violation of stealing applicants’ ideas (Gillespie, Chubin, & Kurzon, 
1985). Moreover, an experiment by Balietti and colleagues testing the effect of competition on peer 
evaluation of creative work found that increased competition resulted in more self-serving reviews and 
more frequent disagreement between reviewers (Balietti, Goldstone, & Helbing, 2016).  
While evaluators closely connected to creators may have something to gain from nepotism, such as 
advancing the career of their students or engaging in quid-pro-quo with collaborators, the incentive for 
distant reviewers is much more difficult to pinpoint. Indeed, the standard policy of recusing only the most 
closely connected individuals, such as dissertation advisors or co-authors, from reviewing (Lamont, 2009; 
Li, 2017) is presumably based on the assumption that distant reviewers have little to no such incentive for 
nepotism.    
Subjective criteria 
A distinct collection of literature on peer review emphasizes the interpretive flexibility of “soft” 
evaluative criteria (Guetzkow, Lamont, & Mallard, 2004; Lamont, 2009; Lamont & Mallard, 2005).  
Reviewers are typically instructed to establish whether a scientific work is (1) scientifically valid and (2) 
“novel,” “significant,” or “original”3. There are good reasons to think judgments of significance and novelty 
are fundamentally more uncertain and, consequently, invite more disagreement and greater favoritism than 
judgments of validity. Unlike validity judgments, evaluations of impact and significance are judgments 
about an uncertain future: will a particular work prove valuable to a wide audience of scientists? Moreover, 
the concepts “significance” and “originality” are themselves ambiguous. For example, Guetzkow and 
colleagues (2004) found that social scientists and humanists generally agreed that significance and 
originality were valuable, but humanists tended to value originality regarding data or broad approach, while 
social scientists valued methodological and technical novelty. The editors of the high-impact biomedical 
journal eLife seek manuscripts that are “authoritative, rigorous, insightful, enlightening or just beautiful,” 
and note that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder, and ideas about what is beautiful can change over time” 
(Malhotra & Marder, 2015). Furthermore, several studies find that scientists across the natural and life 
sciences ascribe different meanings to the terms “broader impacts” and “societal impact” (Bornmann, 2013; 
Derrick & Samuel, 2016; Mardis, Hoffman, & McMartin, 2012).  
Multiple studies demonstrate that evaluators interpret subjective evaluation criteria in ways that favor 
work similar to their own (Lamont, 2009; Lamont & Mallard, 2005). For example, Travis and Collins 
                                                     
3 The most prestigious scientific journals place great value on manuscripts’ significance, originality, and novelty. 
For example, Nature seeks manuscripts that are of “outstanding scientific importance” and “of interest to an 
interdisciplinary readership,” Science seeks manuscripts that “present novel and broadly important data,” while Cell 
seeks manuscripts presenting “conceptual advances of unusual significance” on questions of “wide interest” 
(http://www.nature.com/nature/authors/get_published/index.html#a1, http://www.sciencemag.org/authors/science-
information-authors, http://www.cell.com/cell/authors. Accessed 2017-03-13.)  
(1991) relate discussions from committees evaluating physics grants, in which committee members thought 
it crucial to contextualize reviews from scientists with a characterization of their camps. “It’s a club . . . it 
doesn’t move with the times much,” wrote one committee member of the referee reports (334). When all 
referee reports of a particular grant originated from one “camp,” a committee member asked the organizers 
to obtain additional reports, as the original referees all “belonged to a mutual admiration society” (335). 
One evaluator from Lamont’s (2009) study of social science and humanities funding competitions lacked a 
close connection to an applicant, but nevertheless felt attracted to that applicant’s proposal on the basis of 
seemingly subjective criteria. “I see scholarly excellence and excitement in this one project on food,” the 
evaluator reported, “possibly because I see resonance with my own life, my own interests, who I am, and 
other people clearly don’t. And that’s always a bit of a problem, that excellence is in some ways … what 
looks most like you” (Lamont, 2009, p. 130). Another evaluator remarked, “The [proposal] on dance [I 
liked a lot]; I’m an avid dance person . . . in terms of studying dance, the history of dance and vernacular 
dance in particular. So I found that one very interesting, very good” (130).  
How a bias mechanism activated by subjective review criteria affects reviewers of differing closeness 
to the author(s) hinges on the distribution of scientific tastes. Although quantitative data on taste 
distributions are lacking, examples from qualitative research including those above suggest that similar 
tastes are not limited to the most closely connected individuals. Neither should tastes be unrelated to 
closeness – proximity in social networks is consistently associated with similar tastes and opinions, whether 
through homophilous selection of network ties or influence between proximate nodes (McPherson, Smith-
Lovin, & Cook, 2001). In this way, limited current evidence suggests that similar tastes on subjective review 
criteria should fall smoothly with decreasing proximity or intensity of connection to author(s).  
Schools of thought 
The literature summarized above tends to assume that reviewers agree on what constitutes valid science. 
They implicitly assume that a widely shared scientific method produces facts on which most can agree. The 
belief that a uniform scientific method compels consensus is pervasive across the physical and life sciences 
(Cole, 1983; Hargens, 1988) and extends to quantitative social sciences like economics (Lamont, 2009; 
Lazear, 2000). For example, editors of economics journals regard assessments of whether a paper is 
technically correct as relatively straightforward, whereas assessing its importance is “the hardest decision” 
(Hirshleifer, Berk, & Harvey, 2016, p. 232).  
Detailed qualitative studies of scientific evaluation, however, reveal that at the research frontier, 
uncertainty and disagreement regarding technical matters is not unusual. Positions on such contested topics 
typically overlaps with scientists’ social connections (Griffith & Mullins, 1972; Travis & Collins, 1991). 
Communities of like-minded scholars have been analyzed at various levels of aggregation and described as 
invisible colleges (Crane, 1972), thought collectives (Fleck, 1979), epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina, 
1999), paradigms (Kuhn, 1962), scientific/intellectual movements (Frickel & Gross, 2005), schools of 
thought (Merton 1968), and so on. We choose the term “schools of thought” for consistency with existing 
peer review literature (Lee, 2012) and denote by it the communities of researchers within a particular 
discipline that hold similar views on contested scientific topics. Shared views on contested topics rests atop 
shared assumptions about the world and how to properly investigate it. Recent work in the history and 
philosophy of science on the disunity of science highlights that topics are often contested on methodological 
grounds (Dupré, 1995; Galison & Stump, 1996; Geison, 1993). Methodological disagreements are 
ubiquitous in the humanities and softer social sciences, where different epistemic communities coexist 
(Abend, 2006; R. Collins, 1994; Davis, 1994; Guetzkow et al., 2004; Lamont, 2009). Nevertheless, 
methodological disagreements occur at the research frontier of even the hard sciences (Cole, 1983). Studies 
of peer review in the physical and life sciences reveal that when reviewers rate works separately on 
methodological and non-methodological aspects, agreement between reviewers on methodological aspects 
is no higher than agreement on significance or “reader interest” (Cicchetti, 1991; Jayasinghe, Marsh, & 
Bond, 2003; Lee, 2012).   
Studies by scholars in the science and technology studies community further undermine the perceived 
straightforwardness of technical assessments (D. A. MacKenzie, 1990; Shapin, 1995). In particular, 
scientists do not trust all technical information equally (D. MacKenzie, 1998; Porter, 1996). For instance, 
in a case study on the slow acceptance of continental drift theory, Solomon (1992) demonstrated that 
although the quantitative evidence for the theory was widely known, how much geologists trusted that 
evidence depended on the geographical focus of their own work. Seemingly straightforward descriptions 
of scientific work, inscribed in manuscripts, are usually insufficient to overcome skepticism and diffuse 
complex ideas or methods (H. M. Collins, 1974, 2001; D. MacKenzie & Spinardi, 1995; Polanyi, 1958). 
As with the subjective review criteria mechanism, the “schools of thought bias” varies with the 
proximity of connection between reviewer and author(s) and depends on the distribution of substantive 
scientific views. The same arguments made regarding subjective review criteria apply to schools of thought: 
homophily in substantive views should fall off smoothly with increasing distance between scientists.  
2.3. Summary 
Each of the three mechanisms we detail above – nepotism, subjective criteria, and schools of thought – 
is capable of generating bias towards close connections in peer review4. Consequently, the salience of each 
mechanism is unclear in most review settings. Distinctive peer review settings, however, can enable us to 
isolate mechanisms. The foregoing discussion suggests that decrease in competition should decrease bias 
attributable to nepotism. Furthermore, reviewers without direct connections to an applicant or author should 
be relatively uncorrupted by nepotism. Increase in the concreteness of review criteria, such as evaluating 
work on validity alone, should decrease bias attributable to subjective review criteria and increase 
consensus. Meanwhile, neither competition nor exclusive evaluation of scientific validity should affect the 
level of bias attributable to substantive disagreements between schools of thought. Prior studies have 
focused on prospective, highly competitive evaluations of works or individuals on the basis of validity and 
significance, originality, and other “soft” criteria. In such settings all mechanisms may, in principle, be 
equally salient. In contrast, the setting we analyze here involves retrospective evaluations of validity in an 
                                                     
4 The mechanisms can also generate disagreement among reviewers, if their degree of connectedness to the work’s 
creators differs. 
uncompetitive publishing environment. Section 4.5 utilizes the setting’s uniqueness to explore the salience 
of each mechanism in contributing bias. 
3. Data and methods 
 
3.1. PLOS ONE 
PLOS ONE is among the world’s largest scientific journals, publishing approximately 30,000 peer-
reviewed papers a year in all fields of science and medicine5. It was founded in 2006 by the Public Library 
of Science with the mission to publish and make publicly accessible all scientific work meeting high 
standards of scientific validity, regardless of the work’s perceived novelty or impact6. “The idea … to 
decouple impact assessment from technical assessment,” wrote Mark Patterson, director of publishing at 
PLOS, “is at the heart of the journal’s novelty” (quoted in Adams, n.d.). Its first managing editor Chris 
Surridge stressed the problem of subjectivity: 
Traditionally a lot of the work that goes into peer reviewing consists of asking questions like: “How 
significant is this? How surprising are the conclusions?” Essentially, these are subjective 
questions. A more objective question to ask would be: “Is this properly done science” (interview 
on Poynder Blog, June 15, 2006). 
Ten years later, the editor-in-chief Joerg Heber emphasized again that, “The more … journals operating 
without any subjective selection criteria of their published output beyond scientific validity, the better it is 
for science” (Heber, 2016). This claim suggests that conditional on the accuracy of scientific findings, 
assessments of significance and originality vary widely and should be carried out “post-publication” by the 
full community of scientists. 
PLOS ONE thus welcomes types of submissions conventional publishers may reject because they are 
not novel or significant enough, including negative results, replications, and so on (MacCallum, 2011).  
Furthermore, the journal is published entirely online, enabling PLOS ONE to accept a nearly limitless 
number of submissions. Consequently, PLOS ONE may accept multiple articles on a given topic, easing 
                                                     
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PLOS_ONE. Accessed 2016-10-23. 
6 http://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/criteria-for-publication. Accessed 2017-03-15.  
the zero-sum competition often faced by groups that pursue similar research. The journal currently accepts 
approximately 70% of submissions and its 2016 impact factor7 is 2.81. In sum, PLOS ONE’s validity-
focused evaluation, lack of space limitations, relatively high acceptance rates, and prestige that rests well 
below the highest impact journals like Science and Nature reinforce each other to create a review system 
that prioritizes scientific validity and minimizes incentives for nepotistic reviewing. 
 PLOS ONE’s review process, like that of many other natural science journals, is single-blind: reviewers 
observe the identities and affiliations of the authors. Although it is intuitive to expect a single-blind review 
process to enable more relational bias than a double-blind process, existing studies comparing the two 
processes have been surprisingly inconsistent in identifying even small differences (Jefferson, Alderson, 
Wager, & Davidoff, 2002; Laband & Piette, 1994a; Lee et al., 2013; Rooyen, Godlee, Evans, Smith, & 
Black, 1998; Wessely, 1998). In at least one instance, the absence of effects cannot be explained by 
unsuccessful blinding, when reviewers are able to guess authors’ identities, as successfully blinded 
reviewers do not appear to favor close colleagues (Justice et al., 1998). Indeed, the persistence of single-
blind reviewing is based at least in part on editors’ doubts that moving to a double-blind system would 
result in any improvements (“Nature journals offer double-blind review,” 2015). It is thus unclear to what 
extent this feature of the review process affects our results, if at all.  
Our analysis focuses on the field of neuroscience. As a life science, neuroscience does not suffer from 
the criticism leveled at many social science and humanities disciplines that researchers are unable to agree 
on fundamental assumptions and goals or to create cumulative knowledge (R. Collins, 1994; Davis, 1994; 
Hargens, 1988).  Nevertheless, neuroscientists pursue research from multiple methods and perspectives, 
with familiar disagreements erupting at the boundaries between them. One axis of division concerns the 
appropriate level of analysis, with some neuroscientists arguing that the field’s preoccupation with the 
characterization of individual neurons misses emergent behavior that arises when networks of neurons 
interact (Jonas & Kording, 2016; Krakauer, Ghazanfar, Gomez-Marin, MacIver, & Poeppel, 2017; Yong, 
                                                     
7 he impact factors during the period in which our data were collected were 4.09 (in 2011) and 3.73 (in 2012). 
Source: Clarivate Analytics. Journal Citation Reports. Accessed 2017-06-26.   
2017). Another axis of division concerns the degree to which findings from model organisms like mice 
generalize to humans (Preuss, 2000; Yong, 2017). Yet another division lies between experimentalists and 
computational modelers (“The practice of theoretical neuroscience,” 2005). Empirically, peer review in 
neuroscience displays the same (high) levels of disagreement observed in other disciplines (Rothwell & 
Martyn, 2000). This diversity of neuroscience raises the possibility that disagreements and biases in the 
review of neuroscience work reflects differences in perspectives on what type of research is scientifically 
valid.  
3.2. Reviews and co-authorship 
We obtained the complete review history for 7,981 neuroscience manuscripts submitted to PLOS ONE 
between 2011 and 2012. The manuscripts were authored by 46,455 individuals and reviewed by 21,665 
reviewers. Many of these manuscripts went through more than one round of review, resulting in 24,022 
total reviews. The sensitivity of the data necessitated strong confidentiality agreements with the journal and 
IRB8. Source data remained encrypted and noise was added to reviewer decisions—3% of decisions were 
randomly flipped—to enhance privacy. Only after adding noise and removing identifying information was 
the data analyzed. 
The reviews dataset was supplemented using Scopus, a bibliographic database covering more than 
20,000 peer-reviewed journals9. The full name and institutional affiliation for each author, reviewer and 
editor were queried with the Author Search functionality10. The Scopus API matches the name with 
disambiguated profiles in its database. In cases where a search returned multiple results with unrelated 
information, we performed a secondary search on these results to compute simple edit-distance matching. 
After obtaining the Scopus ID of all authors, we used another call to the API to obtain their h-index, or the 
maximum number of articles h that each scientist had published receiving h or higher citations. While 
                                                     
8 IRB was granted through one of the authors’ institutions and only two authors had access to source data. 
9 https://www.elsevier.com/solutions/scopus/content. Accessed 2017-07-19. 
10 https://dev.elsevier.com/sc_apis.html. Accessed 2017-03-15. 
Scopus does not capture all scientific output for authors, largely lacking conference proceedings, 
proceedings are not viewed as a critical output in neuroscience departments, and the h-index was only used 
for relative comparison between authors.  
A Scopus query11 was used to identify the lifetime co-authors of each reviewer, author, and editor. 
Resulting co-authorship ties were combined into a single network. The final co-authorship network 
included 1,822,998 individuals (PLOS authors, reviewers, editors, and their co-authors) and 4,188,523 co-
authorship ties. In this network, the average neuroscientist has 4.59 co-authorship connections, 3,258 
neuroscientists have 0 co-authors, and 1,124,153 neuroscientists have 1 co-author. Individuals with only 1 
co-authorship tie tend to be co-authors of the PLOS individuals whom we initially queried12.  
This co-authorship network comprised of PLOS individuals and their “one step” connections is 
remarkably well connected: 99.6% of the ~1.8M individuals are connected directly or indirectly, with very 
few singletons or separate clusters. Nevertheless, the network is measured only partially, as Scopus query 
limits made it infeasible for us to identify all second order (co-authors of co-authors) and higher order 
connections. Consequently, measured distances between any two individuals must be interpreted carefully. 
Details on measurement error are located in Supplementary Materials A. Ties of length 1, 2, and 3 should 
not be affected by artificial sparseness. Ties of length 4 or higher, however, are likely artificially high—
some would be of length 3 in the complete network. To reflect accurate uncertainty about the distances of 
ties measured as length 3 or greater, we relabel all such ties as “3+.”  
Manuscripts were typically authored by several individuals. In order to measure a reviewer’s co-
authorship distance to a manuscript, it was necessary to aggregate the several reviewer-author distances 
into a single number. Figure 3.1. illustrates this issue for both co-authorship and expertise. 
                                                     
11 This query was capable of returning at most 179 co-authors with whom the individual collaborated over her 
lifetime. The degree and consequences of this censoring are discussed in Supplementary Materials A. 
12 This network is thus a “one step out” network - it begins with “seed nodes” from PLOS ONE and measures their 
connectivity to all other nodes, but does not measure the connectivity of these other nodes, as a “two steps out” 
network would. Consequently, the measured network is sparser than in reality. 
 Figure 3.1. Diagram illustrating the measurement of co-authorship connection between a reviewer 
and author(s) of a manuscript. To aggregate the multiple co-authorship measures we take the 
minimum distance (e.g. closest co-authorship between a reviewer and any of a manuscript’s 
authors). 
  
The hypothetical manuscript submission has three authors, so Reviewer 1 has three separate and co-
authorship distances to the manuscript. Intuitively, we could aggregate these distances with minimum, 
maximum, mean, or mode. In our context, minimum distance makes the most sense because lab-based 
research is common in neuroscience, and so a reviewer may have a close tie to the principal investigator 
heading the lab, but a distant tie to the manuscript’s other, more junior authors. To the extent that principal 
investigators personify the cognitive and social dimensions of the lab’s output, minimum distance between 
a reviewer and all authors would most accurately measure the connection between reviewer and manuscript. 
Figure 3.2. displays the distribution of minimum co-authorship distance.  
 
Figure 3.2. Histogram of minimum co-authorship distances between manuscript reviewers and 
authors. Distance 1 denotes co-authors, 2 denotes co-authors of co-authors, and so on. 
 
Close co-authorship ties (distance 1 and 2) are infrequent relative to 3+ ties. Nevertheless, it is notable that 
more than 1000 reviews in the dataset were written by reviewers who had at one time co-authored with at 
least one of the authors.   
 To assess whether formal co-authorship connections are meaningful signals of personal or 
intellectual affinity, we compared them with choices PLOS authors faced when submitting manuscripts: 
who to nominate as a reviewer13? Although we are not aware of systematic evidence on how authors 
choose suggested reviewers, it is plausible that they nominate individuals most likely to provide a 
favorable review, perhaps with the additional constraint that the nomination does not violate obvious 
conflicts of interest. The set of nominated reviewers may be considered an “ideal” personal network – 
individuals most likely to like each other’s work. To the extent that this privately nominated “ideal” 
network overlaps with the actual network constructed from co-authorship connections, the co-authorship 
network serves as a meaningful proxy of affinities between scientists. Figure 3.3 displays the overlap 
between real and ideal networks.  
 
Figure 3.3. Distribution of author-suggested and non-suggested reviewers by their distance to the 
author(s). Co-authorship distance and nomination are meaningfully associated (ρ = -0.27) with 
closer reviewers likelier to be nominated.  
 
The figure shows a clear pattern: the more distant the reviewer, the less likely he or she to have been 
author-nominated. Meanwhile, more than 50 percent of the closest reviewers (co-authors) were nominated 
by the author(s). Although analyses comparing reviews from nominated to non-nominated reviewers have 
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been published, to our knowledge this is the analysis of who is nominated in the first place, and the first to 
establish the usefulness of easily observable co-authorships as a proxy the typically unobserved affinities 
between scientists’ views.   
3.3. Measuring disagreement 
We measured disagreement between reviewers separately in each round of review for two reasons. 
First, inter-rater reliability metrics assume that raters make decisions independently (Hayes & Krippendorff, 
2007), but PLOS ONE reviewers observe each other’s decisions after the first round, so decisions in 
subsequent rounds are likely influenced by this information. Second, it is unclear whether the goals of later 
rounds of review match those of the first. Evidence is limited, but in conventional journals, review of revise-
and-resubmit appears to focus narrowly on the altered scope or rhetorical framing (Goodman, Berlin, 
Fletcher, & Fletcher, 1994; Strang & Siler, 2015a; Teplitskiy, 2015).  
We used Krippendorf’s alpha as the index of inter-rater reliability14 (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). 
Although the literature on inter-rater agreement uses a wide variety of measures (Hallgren, 2012; 
Krippendorff, 2004), Krippendorf’s alpha has three advantages: it allows for ordinal ratings, a variable 
number of reviewers per manuscript, and it measures agreement above the level expected from random15 
decisions. An alpha of 1.00 denotes perfect agreement, while 0.00 denotes no statistical relation between 
manuscript and ratings. The worst-case scenario of 0.00 can be interpreted as one in which “coders do not 
understand what they are asked to interpret, categorize by throwing dice, or examine unequal units of 
analysis, causing research results that are indistinguishable from chance events” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 
413). The rating scale is treated as ordinal, which penalizes disagreements on adjacent rating categories less 
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studies. 
15 In the context of inter-rater reliability, random decisions are conceptualized as follows: reviewers are assumed to 
know the overall probability distribution of decisions (e.g., 90% Rejects, 10% Accepts) and select their decision 
randomly from that distribution. Indices of inter-rater reliability measure agreement levels above the baseline level 
expected from such random decisions.  
 
than distant ones. For instance, two reviewers who assess a manuscript as “Accept” and “Minor revisions” 
are assumed to have less disagreement than if they evaluated it as “Accept” or “Reject.” 
3.4. Modeled variables 
 
Dependent variable: review score. Reviewers were instructed to provide a written report and assign the 
manuscript one of four recommendations: “Accept,” “Minor revision,” “Major revision,” and “Reject.” For 
ease of analysis, these recommendations were recoded to numerical scores of 4.0, 3.0, 2.0, and 1.0, 
respectively.  
Explanatory variables. The central explanatory variable is co-authorship distance between reviewer and 
author(s). Two additional variables are included to account for the prominence or seniority of reviewers 
and authors. Controlling for prominence is important because it is correlated with network distance  (see 
Supplementary Materials B), but prominent reviewers may review in ways not accounted for by the 
mechanisms on which this study focuses. For example, prominent reviewers may delegate reviews to their 
students or postdocs or they may take on the perspective of a “spokesperson” for a particular sub-field. To 
account for a prominence effect, we include the reviewer’s h-index and her total number of connections in 
the co-authorship network. For regression specifications without manuscript fixed effects, we include the 
author(s)’s mean h-index and number of network connections. Table 3.2 describes these variables; 
Supporting Materials contains the complete correlation matrix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics for variables used in analysis. 
 Description Mean SD Min. Max. Valid 
obs. 
Review score: 
all rounds 
 
Reviewer’s decision, coded as 
1.0= Reject, 2.0=Major revision, 
3.0=Minor revision, 4.0=Accept 
 
2.59 
 
1.03 
 
1.0 
 
4.0 
 
24022 
1st round only   2.24 0.86 1.0 4.0 16085 
Co-authorship 
distance  
Minimum distance in co-
authorship network between 
reviewer and manuscript 
author(s)  
2.60 0.63 1 3 14090 
Num. of ties of 
reviewer 
Degree of reviewer in co-
authorship network 
98.96 74.46 0 401 16600 
Mean num. of ties 
of author(s) 
Mean degree of manuscript 
author(s) in co-auth. network 
84.02 48.52 0 412 23163 
h-index of reviewer Hirsch index of reviewer 18.29 14.70 0 132 16263 
Mean h-index of 
author(s) 
Mean Hirsch index of 
manuscript author(s) 
14.76 9.83 0 101 23104 
Note: Because of measurement limitations, co-authorship distances >3 are recoded as 3.0 and referred to as “3+” 
(see Supplementary Materials A). 
4. Results 
This section is divided into five parts. The first describes the overall distribution of review decisions 
and the second focuses on disagreement between manuscript reviewers. The third details the effect of co-
authorship connections on review decisions and the fourth estimates regression models that control for the 
manuscript characteristics. The final part focuses on disambiguating mechanisms driving co-author bias. 
4.1. Decisions across review rounds 
Of the 7,981 neuroscience manuscripts submitted for an initial round of review, 73% were eventually 
accepted. 51% of the manuscripts received a final decision during the initial round of review, 40% continued 
on to a second round, and 8% went for a third round. Figure 4.1 displays the distribution of the 24,022 total 
review decisions across the first four rounds of review16. 
 
Figure 4.1. Distribution of decisions across review rounds (num. of cases in parentheses). 
Manuscripts undergoing more than one round of review are included in the calculations for each 
relevant round. Fractions in each round do not sum to 100% because a small fraction of submissions 
is terminated by the author(s) or the editor(s). A negligible fraction of manuscripts underwent more 
than 4 rounds of review. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that reviewers make use of the entire range of decisions, particularly in the first two 
rounds. “Accept” decisions are relatively rare in the first round, but become more frequent in subsequent 
rounds; “Rejects” follow the opposite pattern. The distribution of decisions across rounds is consistent with 
revise-and-resubmit trajectories observed in other journals. In particular, studies of journals in sociology, 
management, and medicine find that (1) reviewers challenge manuscripts in the first round and (2) authors 
attempt to address the challenges, particularly to revising the manuscript’s interpretation and scope 
(Goodman et al., 1994; Strang & Siler, 2015b; Teplitskiy, 2015). If reviewers in the second and subsequent 
rounds perceive that challenges are sufficiently addressed, the manuscript is accepted. In the analyses that 
follow, we analyze decisions across rounds separately for two reasons. As described above, studies of 
                                                     
16 A small number (<1%) of manuscripts went through more than 4 rounds of review. 
revise-and-resubmit practices indicate that the function of review may change qualitatively across rounds, 
from putting forth challenges in the first round, to assessing compliance in second and subsequent rounds. 
Reviewers typically observe each other’s evaluations after the first round, weakening the assumption of 
independence across reviewers.  
4.2. Within-paper disagreement 
Here we describe within-paper disagreement – inter-rater reliability (IRR) – of reviewers, across 
rounds. We measure IRR with Krippendorf’s alpha (see Section 3.3), which equals 0.0 when there is no 
statistical association between the decisions of distinct reviewers for a given manuscript and 1.0 with perfect 
agreement17. Figure 4.2 displays inter-reviewer reliability observed in the first four rounds of review.  
 
Figure 4.2. Inter-rater reliabilities (IRR) by review round. IRRs were computed with Krippendorf’s 
alpha and assume an ordinal level of measurement. Note: computation of IRR in second and later 
rounds does not meet the assumption of independence between raters, as reviewers observe and may 
be influenced by each other’s response following the first round.   
 
                                                     
17 To improve comparability with existing studies (e.g. Cicchetti, 1991), we also report the intra-class correlation 
coefficient ICC (computed after nominal decisions had been converted to numeric values between 1.0 = Reject and 
4.0 = Accept) and Cohen’s weighted Kappa. Because both metrics require an equal number of reviewers for each 
paper, which in our reviews dataset is not always the case, we only include the first 2 reviewers in the computations. 
ICCs in the first four rounds of review were 0.192, 0.194, 0.204, and 0.555. Weighted Kappas were computed with 
squared weighting that penalizes distant mistmatches between reviews (“Accept” vs. “Reject”) more than proximate 
mismatches (“Accept” vs. “Minor revision”). Kappas in the first four rounds were 0.192, 0.194, 0.206, and 0.545. 
Inter-reviewer reliability is poor throughout the review process, but particularly in the initial rounds of 
review. Indeed, reviewers’ decisions in the first round are perilously close to bearing no relationship with 
one another – IRR is 0.193. Interestingly, inter-rater reliability does not increase appreciably in round two 
or even three. This pattern indicates that some fraction of manuscripts in the review pipeline are 
controversial and these contentions are not easily resolved through revision between rounds. Manuscripts 
on which reviewers agree exit the pipeline toward rejection or publication along the way.  
Overall, levels of disagreement for validity-oriented review are entirely comparable to those observed 
in more conventional review settings that value subjective impressions of “impact” and “novelty”. Indeed, 
our IRR of 0.193 is strikingly similar to the average value of 0.17 that Bornmann and colleagues (2010) 
obtained in a meta-analysis of 48 studies of manuscript peer review. Insofar as reviewers follow the PLOS 
ONE mandate to evaluate accuracy alone, low levels of observed agreement here problematize the 
perspective that disagreement in conventional review decisions are explained primarily, if at all, by 
subjective review criteria. Instead, the observed pattern is consistent with the perspective that substantive 
disagreements between schools of thought are widespread and likely account for much of what has 
previously been attributed to nepotism and subjective review criteria.  
4.3. Co-authorship connections and review outcomes 
Here we describe the relationship between reviewers’ decisions and co-authorship connections between 
authors and reviewers. Figure 4.3 illustrates the distribution of reviewers’ decisions as a function of their 
co-authorship distance to manuscripts’ authors. The left panel displays this distribution for the first round 
of review and the right displays it for the second and subsequent rounds.  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Left. 1st round review decisions by reviewer’s (minimum) co-authorship distance to 
manuscript’s author(s). Right. 2nd or later round review decisions by reviewer’s (minimum) co-
authorship distance to manuscript’s author(s). In both panels, the farther the author is from the 
reviewer, the harsher the decision. Fractions at each distance do not sum to 100% because a small 
fraction of submissions is terminated by the author(s) or the editor(s).  
 
Both panels show that each additional step of distance in the co-authorship network is associated with 
harsher reviews: “Rejects” and “Major Revisions” increase, while “Accepts” and “Minor Revisions” 
decline in frequency. Because we observe these patterns across manuscripts, however, it is possible that 
reviewer distance is correlated with manuscript characteristics, e.g., editors assign manuscripts of poorer 
quality to more junior, distant, or otherwise peripheral reviewers. Conversely, the literature on 
categorization and valuation provides a plausible alternative mechanism. This literature found that when 
creative and technical work falls squarely within well-established paradigms, quality judgments quality 
become cognitively easier (Hsu, Roberts, & Swaminathan, 2011; E. W. Zuckerman, 1999) and relatively 
error free (Ferguson & Carnabuci, 2017; Leahey, Beckman, & Stanko, 2017). Scientific work that spans 
boundaries may be more difficult for editors to “place,” resulting in assignment to ill-fitting and possibly 
harsher reviewers.  
To explore the possibility that reviewer co-authorship distance is correlated with unobserved 
manuscript characteristics, we compare decisions from reviewers who assess the same manuscript. Figure 
4.4 displays differences in within-manuscript decisions during the first round of review (left panel) and 
second and later rounds (right panel).  
        
Figure 4.4. Left. Differences in 1st round decisions between reviewers who are close or far 
from the manuscript’s author(s). Reviewers favor authors closer in co-authorship. As expected, 
the biggest difference (0.42 points) is observed in maximally close (1) and distant (3+) review 
panels. Right. Differences in decisions during 2nd and later review rounds. In these rounds, the 
only substantial difference is between the increased favor shown by reviewers of distance 1 
rather than 2. In both panels, decisions were converted to numerical scores as Reject=1.0, 
Accept=4.0. 
 
Within-manuscript patterns that we observe are consistent with those found across manuscripts: reviewers 
favor closer co-authors. In the initial round of review, reviewers who had at some point co-authored with 
one or more authors of the manuscript (distance 1) scored manuscripts an average of 0.42 points better than 
reviewers who are of co-authorship distance 3 or higher. This difference represents approximately 40% of 
a decision “level ” e.g. between Major revision and Reject, and about 49% of the standard deviation of first-
round review scores (sd = 0.86). This level of favoritism is of the order observed in settings where science 
or scientists are encouraged to evaluate on “importance” criteria beyond validity, e.g. 0.22 points on a 5.0-
point scale (Wennerås & Wold, 1997).    
 Differences in decisions shrink with the difference in co-authorship distance between author(s) and 
reviewers. Reviewers who are co-authors of co-authors (distance 2) offer scores on average 0.09 more 
favorable than reviewers of co-authorship distance 3+. The pattern observed in rounds 2 and later is less 
unequivocal. Here, the main difference is between close (distance 2) and very close (distance 1) reviewers: 
more proximate reviewers give a bonus of 0.30. Surprisingly, in review panels comprising other types of 
reviewers, more distant reviewers give more favorable scores than close ones, albeit by a tiny amount (< 
0.06 points). In sum, decisions across and within papers, particularly in the initial round of review, reveal 
that reviewers favor close authors in the co-authorship network.  
4.4. Regression models 
Here we focus on isolating the effect of co-authorship from manuscript and reviewer characteristics. 
Co-authorship distances are negatively correlated with reviewers’ prominence as measured by the h-index 
(ρ = -0.257, p < 0.001): more prominent reviewers are more closely connected to the authors they review. 
It is thus desirable to control for reviewers’ h-indices and overall network connectivity to understand 
whether apparent effects from co-authorship connection hold independent of these quantities.  
We focus on review decisions in the first round to best meet the assumption of independence between 
observations and because subsequent rounds likely differ in function from the first. We estimate a set of 
linear models with the following specification: 
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐼𝐸𝑊. 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝐸𝑗 + β1𝐶𝑂𝐴𝑈𝑇𝐻𝑂𝑅. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗  + β2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑗 + 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝐼𝐸𝑊. 𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
 
Fixed effects 𝐹𝐸𝑗 for each manuscript in the first round of review control for unobserved manuscript and 
author characteristics, such as inherent quality, and enable us to isolate effects of co-authorship more 
directly than studies that use group, rather than individual, review decisions (e.g. Wennerås & Wold, 1997). 
The dependent variable REVIEW.SCOREij is the numerical review decision (1.0=Reject, 4.0=Accept) by 
reviewer i of manuscript j. COAUTHOR.DISTij is the minimum co-authorship distance between reviewer i 
and manuscript j’s author(s) and takes on the values 1, 2, or 3. The CONTROLSij vector includes reviewer 
i’s h-index and her overall number of co-authorship network connections. Although the focus is on first-
round decisions, REVIEW.ROUNDij is added for the last model, which pools data from all rounds. Table 
4.1 presents estimates from partial and full regressions specified above. 
 
Table 4.1. Regressions estimating the associations between reviewers’ score deviations with co-
authorship, expertise, and controls.  
Baseline Model 1 regresses first round review score on co-authorship distance. Estimates from model 1 
reveal that close co-authorship connections are associated with favorable reviews: a one-step increase in 
co-authorship closeness between the reviewer and the manuscript author(s) is associated with a 0.195-point 
improvement in review score. This effect represents 23% of a standard deviation for first-round review 
scores. In Model 2, which adds several reviewer and author(s) controls, co-authorship distance remains 
significant and increases in size.  
   
  Dependent variable:  
Review score (1.0=Reject, 4.0=Accept) 
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Co-author distance 
(1=close, 3+=far) 
-0.195*** 
(0.014) 
-0.219*** 
(0.015) 
-0.088*** 
(0.025) 
-0.107*** 
(0.026) 
-0.101*** 
(0.021) 
 
 
 
  
 
Round of review     0.864*** 
     (0.014) 
Controls:       
Reviewer h-index  -0.0003  -0.001 0.0003 
  (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) 
Reviewer n. of co-
authorships 
 -0.001
*** 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.001* 
(0.0004) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
Author(s)’s mean h-
index 
 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
  
 
Author(s)’s mean n. of 
co-authorships 
 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
  
 
Manuscript FE N N Y Y Y 
Observations 9,092 9,032 9,092 9,040 13,580 
R2  0.021 0.027 0.004  0.007 0.356 
F Statistic 
190.806***  
(df = 1; 9090) 
49.846*** 
(df=5; 9026) 
11.916*** 
(df = 1; 2998) 
4.337***  
(df = 6; 2964) 
1027385*** 
(df = 4, 7447) 
Note: Estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is Review score, which takes on values 1.0=Reject 
to 4.0=Accept. Asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance at the p < .1, p < .05, and p < .01 levels, respectively, 
with 2-tailed t-test. The R2 for models with fixed effects is the within-manuscript variance explained.  
 
 
 Model 3 regresses review score on co-authorship with manuscript fixed effects. The effect of co-
authorship distance is in the same direction but nearly halved in size: a step of proximity is now associated 
with only a 0.088-point improvement in review score – 10% of a standard deviation for first-round scores. 
The decrease in effect size suggests that higher quality manuscripts, as measured by favorable review 
scores, tend to be assigned to closer reviewers. Alternately, editors may have an easier time “locating” 
manuscripts that fit neatly into conventional research paradigms, and assign them to reviewers familiar with 
and sympathetic to those paradigms. The change in effect size between random and fixed effects models 
underscores the importance of fully controlling for observed and unobserved manuscript characteristics. 
Model 4 adds reviewer controls to the fixed effects model, leading to a slightly increased co-authorship 
effect size (12% of a standard deviation for first-round scores). Model 5 pools data from all rounds of review 
and is presented for completeness. As expected, reviewers’ scores are substantially higher in later rounds 
of review, and the effect of co-authorship does not appreciably change. 
 The variance in review scores explained by our four main models, particularly fixed effects models 3 
and 4 (see Table 4.1, note), is modest. It is instructive to compare these estimates to a comparable study of 
scientific evaluation. Bagues and colleagues’ (2015) studied promotion decisions in Italian academia. The 
authors found that connections between evaluators and candidates explain 0.2% of the variance in 
evaluators’ decisions, accounting for candidate fixed effects (Bagues et al. 2015, Table 7, model 1). The 
explained (adjusted) variance increases to 6.6% when they add evaluator fixed-effects (Bagues et al. 2015, 
Table 7, model 2), which our analysis does not do. Considered together, these studies highlight just how 
poorly variation in evaluation decisions is understood, even though specific evaluators score consistently 
across papers. Accounting for connections, one of the most intuitive sources of variation, leaves much to 
explain. 
 Lastly, “Reject” is the most consequential recommendation a reviewer can make. In order to explore 
how rejection probability varies with reviewer distance, we recoded reviewers’ decisions as 1.0=Reject and 
0.0=otherwise. Results from a logistic model18 of rejection on co-authorship distance, reviewer’s h-index, 
number of co-authorship ties, and manuscript fixed effects, echo estimates from prior models. Figure 4.5 
displays predicted probabilities from this model of rejection as a function of co-authorship distance, with 
other variables held at their means.  
 
Figure 4.5. Predicted probabilities of reviewers recommending “Reject” as a function of co-
authorship distance between the reviewer and author(s).  
 
The probability of rejection increases steadily with co-authorship distance: close reviewers rarely reject 
manuscripts (7.1%), while the most distant reject more than a fifth (20.4%).  
4.5. Mechanisms driving bias 
Previous sections established that PLOS ONE reviewers, tasked with evaluating scientific validity 
alone, disagreed as often as reviewers for conventional journals and displayed a bias towards closely 
connected authors. What drives co-authorship bias? Insofar as it is followed, PLOS ONE’s validity-
oriented review should rule out the mechanism of subjective review criteria. Indeed, the review process 
was designed specifically with this goal in mind. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
reviewers fail to comply with instructions. In principle, editors should be able to identify non-compliant 
reviewers and either train them or exclude them from future invitations.  
We now consider the two remaining mechanisms, nepotism and schools of thought. Section 2.2 argued 
that nepotism should be most salient in competitive, zero-sum environments. PLOS ONE is relatively non-
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competitive by design, however: it accepts 70% of submissions and any submission meeting its standards 
of scientific validity can be published. Another argument comes from equivocal outcomes in experiments 
designed to reduce bias directly by anonymizing scientific work before review. Such “blinding” 
experiments should make nepotism unlikely, as reviewers should be unable (or at least unlikely) to identify 
the author(s), and consciously or non-consciously deduce self-benefit. These experiments have been 
inconsistent in finding even small effects (Fisher, Friedman, & Strauss, 1994; Jefferson et al., 2002; Lee et 
al., 2013), however, suggesting either that reviewers are capable of guessing authors identities or that 
nepotism does not play a major role in decisions. 
An additional argument is based on distinguishing close, distant, and very distant reviewers. As 
discussed in section 2.2, close reviewers should have the highest incentive to review nepotistically, i.e. 
favor close connections on non-scientific grounds, and distant and very distant reviewers should have 
little to no such incentive. Our co-authorship measure enables us to separate reviewers into three groups: 
“close” (co-authors), “distant” (co-authors of co-authors), and “very distant” (co-authors of co-authors of 
co-authors or farther). We estimate the intensity of bias for these three reviewer types by estimating a 
regression identical to Model 4, except with co-authorship distances treated as a 3-level factor. Table 4.2 
displays estimates from this model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2. Regression estimating the bias shown by close, distant, and very distant reviewers. 
 
Dependent variable:  
Review score (1.0=Reject, 
4.0=Accept) 
Co-author distance = 2 -0.144** 
 (0.058) 
Co-author distance = 3+ -0.232*** 
 (0.058) 
Controls:   
     Reviewer h-index -0.001 
 (0.002) 
     Reviewer n. of co-authorships -0.001* 
 (0.0004) 
Manuscript FE Y 
Observations 9,040 
R2 (within-manuscript) 0.008 
F Statistic 
5.637***  
(df = 4; 2963) 
Note: Estimates from OLS regression. The dependent variable is Review score, 
which takes on values 1.0=Reject, 4.0=Accept. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the p < .1, p < .05, and p < .01 levels, respectively, with 2-tailed 
t-test. The R2 is the within-manuscript variance explained.  
 
As expected, distant (distance 2) and very distant (distance 3+) reviewers give substantially lower scores 
than close reviewers (distance 1, reference category). Most noteworthy, however, is the degree of favoritism 
exercised by distant versus very distant reviewers. Distant reviewers are 0.232 − 0.144 = +0.88 more 
favorable than those very distant. Both reviewer types should have little to gain from nepotism, an  
assumption institutionalized around the world in policies that recuse only the most closely connected 
reviewers from reviewing. Yet even among distant reviewers, more distant reviewers are substantially 
harsher. Indeed, the difference in favoritism at each step in the co-authorship network is statistically 
indistinguishable - the difference between distant versus very distant reviewers is on the same order as that 
of closest connected versus distant, “arm’s length” reviewers19. This pattern of bias intensity does not square 
with nepotism mechanism but is consistent with schools of thought: if differences in views on contested 
                                                     
19 The calculation is available upon request.  
substantive matters vary smoothly with network proximity, distant reviewers should be more favorable than 
very distant ones.  
These lines of argument are only suggestive. Non-compliance with review instructions and persistent 
(and possibly non-conscious) nepotism surely play a role in evaluation; there are too many reported 
experiences to claim otherwise. Nevertheless, reports also firmly support the arguments above in 
converging on the consistency of our findings with a schools of thought mechanism, the view that on 
contested scientific terrain, even well-intentioned reviewers will favor individuals who share the scientific 
view they themselves espouse and hold. We discuss policy implications from this finding below.   
5. Discussion 
A persistent critique of scientific peer review is that review decisions appear subjective. Instead of 
converging on the underlying quality of a scientific work, reviewers disagree with one another frequently 
and systematically favor work from those within their professional networks. We drew on literatures across 
the social sciences to identify and evaluate dominant explanations for how such patterns of disagreement 
and bias occur in science. Quantitatively oriented scholars, such as information scientists and economists, 
typically focus on nepotism and subjective review criteria. According to this view, a peer review system 
that evaluates work on criterion of scientific validity and minimizes competition between authors and 
reviewers should reduce disagreement and reduce or eliminate favoritism. On the other hand, historians, 
scholars of Science and Technology Studies, and other qualitatively oriented researchers highlight that at 
the research frontier, scientific validity itself is contested by schools of thought with distinct epistemic, 
especially methodological, commitments. According to this view, a validity-oriented peer review will do 
little to reduce disagreement or bias.  
Our analysis of review files for neuroscience manuscripts submitted to PLOS ONE show that reviewers 
disagreed with each other just as often as reviewers in conventional review settings (inter-rater reliability = 
0.19)  that value more subjective criteria, including novelty and significance. Furthermore, we found the 
same pattern of favoritism: reviewers gave authors a bonus of 0.11 points (4-point scale) for every increased 
step of co-authorship network proximity. It bears emphasis that we observe these levels of disagreement 
and favoritism in a setting where reviewers are instructed to assess completed manuscripts on scientific 
correctness alone.  
Such patterns of disagreement and favoritism are difficult to align with a view of the research frontier 
as unified by a common scientific method and divided only by distinctive tastes for novelty and 
significance. These patterns are instead entirely consistent with scholarship on “schools of thought.” 
According to this view, the research frontier is characterized by competing, epistemological cultures or 
schools of thought, members of which disagree on what methods produce legitimate claims and what 
assumptions are valid. The patterns we find are also consistent with nepotism - reviewers’ non-scientific 
considerations corrupt even straightforward assessments of validity. We presented several arguments that 
schools of thought play a major, if not primary role. First, incentives to review nepotistically are likely to 
be much lower in the modest-impact and non-zero sum setting of PLOS ONE. Second, policies designed to 
reduce bias directly, such as blinding reviewers from observing authors’ identities, have proven notably 
inconsistent in identifying even small effects (Jefferson et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2013). Lastly, as discussed 
in section 4.5, even distant reviewers who we expect to be non-nepotistic, give more favorable scores than 
very distant reviewers, who we expect to be equally non-nepotistic. Although not firmly conclusive, we 
believe this study provides strongest quantitative evidence for schools of thought. 
5.1. Limitations 
Our study has several limitations. First, the data are limited to a single discipline – neuroscience. 
Neuroscience combines methods and concepts from a variety of disciplines, so schools of thought may be 
particularly salient. How well our findings generalize to disciplines with more monolithic, shared epistemic 
cultures, such as economics, is unclear. Second, the uniqueness of PLOS ONE is both strength and 
weakness. Its review system and non-zero-sum acceptance policy make it particularly useful for 
disentangling mechanisms of reviewer decision-making. These same mechanism, however, may be difficult 
to generalize to more conventional and competitive review settings. Although the intensity of disagreement 
and bias in PLOS ONE suggest that it is not entirely unusual, there are few studies with which our estimates 
can be directly compared. It is thus possible that dynamics in PLOS ONE represent the “lower bound” for 
pathologies of peer review. Third, our analysis did not conceptualize or attempt to measure the true value 
or quality of manuscripts. Consequently, we cannot directly distinguish whether closely connected 
reviewers overestimate the quality of manuscripts or distantly connected underestimate it. We can only 
conclude that if the scientific validity of a manuscript can be conceptualized to have a single “true” value, 
the reviews of closely or distantly connected reviewers over- and/or under-estimate this value, respectively.   
Fourth, the models we estimate here explain only a small proportion of within-manuscript score 
variation. This explanatory power is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Bagues et al., 2016) and may result 
from how editors select reviewers. Editors typically seek reviewers with substantial expertise but without 
close ties. The observed variation of expertise and connectivity are thus highly constrained. It is possible 
that in settings with larger variation in these quantities, biases would be more pronounced. Low explained 
variance may be interpreted in other ways as well. It is possible that in most cases, reviewers assess “normal 
science,” with uncontested validity. In such cases, the review system may approach its idealized form – 
reviewers agree and hold few systemic biases. Conversely, contests of scientific validity may draw on 
epistemic views that are idiosyncratic, rather than organized within schools of thought that can be measured 
with formal relationships. In sum, disagreements in the evaluation of scientific validity are substantial, 
poorly understood, and continue to be an important area for research.  
5.2. Policy implications 
At the heart of this paper is an evaluation of a publishing experiment. PLOS ONE sought to improve 
the objectivity of peer review by designing a review system that minimized two intuitive causes of 
subjective evaluation: ill-defined and non-technical review criteria and nepotism. Accordingly, PLOS ONE 
evaluates manuscripts only on whether claims are valid and they minimize strategic considerations by 
publishing all work that meets this criterion. Our results indicate that, at least for multi-paradigm fields like 
neuroscience, this policy does not materially reduce disagreement in assessments or eliminate bias. The 
“tenacity” of these patterns suggests that schools of thought are a fundamental reality along the research 
frontier and should be taken into account by research organizations like journals and funding agencies.  
The choice of a reviewer is typically conceptualized as a trade-off between expertise and bias (Bagues 
et al., 2016; Laband & Piette, 1994b; Li, 2017). One can choose (1) an expert reviewer who is biased toward 
her own research area, but can discriminate more effectively between high and low-quality work in this 
area or (2) a less expert reviewer who is unbiased but less effective or discriminating. In prospective 
evaluations of uncertain, future performance with reviewers possessing diverse expertise, this may well be 
the choice. Our work highlights that in assessments of concrete, already completed work and at high levels 
of expertise, reviewers do not uniformly favor or disfavor work within their research area. Instead, one 
faces the choice between (1) a “positive” expert reviewer from within the author(s)’ schools of thought or 
(2) a “negative” expert reviewer outside it (Travis and Collins 1991). Complicating the choice further, in 
many cases the difference between these experts will not be in how much they are corrupted by nepotism 
but where they fall on fundamental disagreements over whether the science is correct. 
In practice, scientific organizations counter the possibility of bias with an intuitive policy: recuse 
reviewers from reviewing individuals to whom they are closely connected. The policy is a sensible response 
to the assumption that only close reviewers are corrupted by nepotism. Our work shows that even if 
nepotism is the mechanism driving bias, it extends beyond close connections: reviewers without close 
connections are biased relative to still more distant reviewers, and the intensity of bias is statistically 
indistinguishable as one reaches farther and farther in the co-authorship network.  
The schools of thought mechanism points to another policy response to reduce bias. If reviewers from 
the same co-authorship cluster tend to share scientific views and favor each other’s work, fair reviews will 
require recruiting reviewers from diverse co-authorship clusters. Reviewers representing different schools 
of thought should be more able to recognize and make explicit to the editor or administrator the views and 
assumptions not shared, and their recommendations should reveal how crucial such differences are. Put in 
other words, editors and funders who value validity and diversity of published or funded output should also 
value diverse evaluators. In this way, scientific peer review converges on a pattern observed in many other 
evaluative contexts: from the selection of R&D projects (Criscuolo, Dahlander, Grohsjean, & Salter, 2016) 
to the hiring of candidates in elite service firms (Rivera, 2012) to policy choices by senators (Stanfield, 
2008), diversity in outcomes requires diverse evaluators (Page, 2008, 2010).  
Lastly, our study has implications for the interpretation of cumulative advantage so commonly observed 
in science and other social spheres (DiPrete & Eirich, 2006; Robert K. Merton, 1968).  Cumulative 
advantage is usually thought to arise in settings where people lack complete information about the quality 
of potential choices and infer quality from existing status (Correll et al., 2017; Sauder, Lynn, & Podolny, 
2012). Our findings highlight a mechanism that can give rise to cumulative advantage even in the absence 
of status signals. High status authors tend to have more connections: they train and co-author with more 
people and thus induce larger schools of thought (Frickel & Gross, 2005). An editor or funder who chooses 
reviewers based on expertise alone is thus likely to “sample” a reviewer from large schools of thought, and, 
unintentionally, solicit more favorable reviews. Conversely, lower status authors who belong to smaller 
schools would be assigned to reviewers from outside their schools. These unfavorable reviewers will lead 
to lower chances of publication, less status for the author, resulting in a downward status spiral.  
In summary, we find evidence that distinct schools of thought appear to account for some, if not most, 
of the variance in reviewer outcomes previously attributed to subjective review criteria and nepotism. Our 
analysis is suggestive of the potential for research to more clearly model and measure scientific consensus 
and policies. To the extent that the research frontier is characterized by distinctive schools of thought with 
divergent epistemological commitments, our work shifts emphasis away from a mission to eliminate 
subjectivity through eliminating “corrupted” reviewers towards one that diversifies and balances it.  
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Supplementary Materials 
A. Co-authorship network 
We constructed the co-authorship network using the Scopus database. The name and institution of each 
author, reviewer, and editor was matched to his or her Scopus ID number and this number was queried to 
identify the individual’s life-time co-authors. The query used Scopus’ author search API 
(http://api.elsevier.com/content/search/author) and the “?co-author=” field. This query returned up to 179 
co-authors for any particular individual. This artificial limit is unlikely to substantively affect our analyses 
because only 0.72% of scientists in the network have 179 or more co-authors. Figure A1 illustrates that the 
number of individuals with 179 authors is anomalously but not substantively high.  
 
 
Figure A1. Distribution of the number of co-authors. The peak at 179 is a consequence of 
this being the maximum number of co-authors the Scopus API could return.  
 
The network is constructed “one-level-out”, with no measurement of co-authors of co-authors, using PLOS 
ONE authors, reviewers, and editors as seed nodes. The final network consists of 1,822,998 nodes and 
4,188,523 co-authorship edges. Although the network is constructed only one-level-out, it is well 
connected. Each author, has, on average, 4.60 co-authors and 99.59% of the individuals are connected to 
one another by at least one path.  
Measurement error 
Although the network includes nearly 2 million individuals and more than 4 million edges, it still leaves 
out an unknown number of relevant scientists and co-authorship ties. How does missing data affect the 
validity of measured co-authorship distances?  
 
Table A1. Effect of missing network data on measured co-author distances.  
Minimum co-authorship 
distance between reviewer and 
author(s) 
Description Expected effect of missing nodes 
and ties 
1 Reviewer has co-authored with at 
least one author 
None 
2 Reviewer shares co-author with at 
least one author 
None 
3 Reviewer shares co-author of co-
author with at least one author 
None 
4+ Reviewer and author are 
separated in co-authorship 
network by at least 3 individuals  
These measurements will, on 
average, be biased upward due to 
missing network nodes and edges. 
Two individuals who according to 
the measured network are 
relatively far from one another, 
e.g. co-authorship distance 5, may 
actually be at distance 3, if 
missing authors and co-authors 
were included in the network. 
47.6% of the relationships in 
PLOS ONE are of length > 3.  
 
 
Distances 4+ are thus biased upward to an unknown degree. Consequently, we recoded these distances as 
3. We use “3+” to refer to this recoded set together with the set of distances actually measured as 3.  
Another major limitation of these co-authorship data is the lack of information on when these co-
authorships were created, i.e. when the co-authored publication was published. Although the PLOS ONE 
data contain manuscripts submitted in 2011 and 2012, the co-authorship network takes into account 
publications published after 2012. An analysis of a random sample of 100 co-authorship links indicates that 
about 23% of these did not exist in 2012 or earlier. This measurement error acts to (erroneously) decrease 
the measured co-authorship distances between authors and reviewers relative to the distances that would 
have existed20 in 2012.   
One consideration limits the severity of such an error. Even a lively collaboration may not yield a 
publication for months if not years. Thus, it is likely that a co-authored publication published a year after 
2012 reflects work that occurred months or years prior, particularly because Scopus does not index the pre-
                                                     
20 For observed co-authorship distances of 1 (the two individuals are co-authors), in 23% of the cases the individuals 
were actually more distant in 2012. For observed co-authorship distances of 2, in (1.00 - 0.77 x 0.77) x 100% = 41% 
of the cases the individuals were actually more distance in 2012. 
print archives relevant to neuroscientists. Consequently, many of the relationships formally recorded after 
2012 were likely present many years earlier.  
B. Correlation matrix of variables used in the analysis 
Table 7.1. Correlation matrix of variables used in the analysis. 
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Review score (1.0=Reject, 4.0=Accept) 1.000 -0.102 0.136 -0.012 -0.014 -0.009 0.011 
Co-author distance (minimum) - 1.000 -0.274 -0.280 -0.257 -0.124 -0.103 
Suggested (=1 if author nominated)  - - 1.000 0.087 0.135 -0.022 -.008 
Reviewer’s n of ties - - - 1.000 0.752 0.099 0.051 
Reviewer’s h-index - - - - 1.000 0.050 0.031 
Author(s)’ n of ties - - - - - 1.000 0.769 
Author(s)’ mean h-index - - - - - - 1.000 
 
